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ABSTRACT: This study extends the recently introduced sequential panel selection method 
(SPSM) to a cointegration framework which is particularly used to investigate Wagner’s law 
for 9 South African provinces between 2001 and 2016. We note that when applying single 
country/region estimates we fail to find evidence of cointegration whereas within panel 
regressions, cointegration effects are present for the entire dataset. In further applying the 
SPSM we observed significant Wagner’s effects for panels inclusive of Gauteng, Eastern 
Cape and Kwazulu-Natal provinces and when these provinces are excluded from the panels, 
cointegration effects are unobserved.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
There exists an upheld tradition in the econometrics literature of combining cross-
section and time series techniques in investigating numerous important macroeconomic 
relationships (see Maddala, 1987 for discussion). One notable fallacy with these ‘panel’ time 
series econometric models is their generalization of a single regression estimate for a host of 
countries or regions which are characterized by multidimensional differences. Recently 
Chortareas and Kapetanois (2011) propose the sequential panel selection method (SPSM) 
which integrates the size power advantages of panel estimates with the heterogeneity 
advantages associated with individual sample estimates. Nevertheless, we note that 
Chortareas and Kapetanois (2009) strictly apply the SPSM to unit root procedures in their 
empirical investigations. Similarly, studies which have subsequently applied the SPSM 
approach have monotonously done so for unit root purposes (see Li et al (2014), Lee (2014) 
and Chang et al. (2015) and Anyikwa et al. (2018)).  
 
In our study we extend the SPSM approach to the case of a cointegration regression 
analysis. AS far as we are concerned our study becomes the first in the literature to 
implement this method. For demonstration purposes we make an application to Wagner’s law 
for 9 South African provinces. We consider this task relevant since available data on 
government expenditure and economic growth for South African provinces is limited to 
annual data spanning from 2001 to 2016. Secondly, a number of previous works have studied 
this relationship from an aggregated country perspective (Ansari et al. (1997), Ziramba 
(2008), Ogbonna (2009), Menyah and Wolde-Rufael (2012), Chipaumire et al. (2014) and 
Odhiambo (2015)) hence ignoring the possible differences existing within provincial budgets. 
And with the economy struggling to recuperate from the repercussions of the 2009-2010 
global recession period, much emphasis has been put on fiscal policy as a vital catalyst for 
economic recovery.  
 
The rest of our study is arranged a follows. Section 2 presents an overview of 
government spending and economic growth in South Africa. Section 3 then presents the 
methodology of the study, section 4 the data and empirical findings whilst the study is 
concluded in section 5 of the paper.  
 
2. AN OVERVIEW OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND GROWTH IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
In South Africa, it is stated by the law (in the Constitution) that taxation and 
government expenditure be the drivers of budgetary policies (Calitz et al. 2014). The 
government has a legal obligation to formulate a fiscal policy that provides and maintains 
public funding. Otherwise, failure to comply with this obligation is deemed unconstitutional 
(Calitz et al. 2014). This is clearly illustrated in the Bill of Rights of South Africa where each 
citizen has the right to basic services such as housing, healthcare, food, water, social security, 
and education. Policymakers in South Africa, especially those in government are tasked with 
the act of balancing limited resources with unlimited needs. The South African government 
has had to invest tremendously in bridging the gap that exists in different regions, developing 
social responsibility projects that support and sustain communities, and most importantly 
creating and investing in capital infrastructure that is growth promoting. 
 
After the 1994 elections, there was a huge shift in public expenditure and the new 
democratic government had to cater to millions under limited resources. Over the last couple 
of decades or the democratic ANC government has implemented a number of large scale 
expenditure programmes (i.e. the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative 
for South African (ASGISA), the National Development Plan (NDP) and the New Growth 
Path (NGP) aimed at addressing the social imbalance inherited from the former Apartheid 
regime. The national budget has being the most common tool for income redistribution which 
to no surprise, led to fiscal deficits (Phiri. 2017) and in 2012, current expenditure, social 
benefits paid and services on public debt accounted for 92.3 percent of general government 
expenditure. Overall, with the size and composition of the public sector in South Africa have 
grown significantly over the last few decades (from R66.3 billion in 1960 to R473.6 billion in 
2012), it is quite surprising that this has not been mirrored onto improved economic growth 
rates for the country.  
 
From an academic standpoint, the empirical evidence on Wagner’s law for South 
Africa is far from reaching a consensus. Whilst the previous studies of Ogbonna (2009), 
Menyah and Wolde-Rufael (2012), Odhiambo (2015) and Phiri (2017) validate Wagner’s 
effect, in which a larger government size is accompanied with increased economic growth, on 
the other hand, the works of Ansari et al. (1997), Ziramba (2008) and Chipaumire et al. 
(2014) fail to find any significant Wagner effects. We note the ambiguity observed in these 
previous findings may be due to the aggregated approach taken by the aforementioned 
authors in reaching their various conclusions on Wagner’s law for South Africa. However, as 
mentioned by Narayan et al. (2008), the use of provincial data is advantageous towards 
investigating Wagners law since provincial data is consistent with the peace and stability 
assumption since provincial budgets do not incur military spending items. Moreover, relying 
on sub-national data implies the exploitation of cross-sectional dimension while minimizing 
the effects of cultural and institutional differences as well as influences of state expenditure in 
dealing with changes in the international economic conditions, all which are important 
assumption underlying Wagner’s law.  
 
3. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1 Wagner’s specifications 
 
The academic literature indicates the existence of six versions of Okun’s law, namely 
the (1) Peacock-Wiseman (1961) version; (2) Pryor (1969) version; (3) Goffman (1968) 
version; (4) Musgrave version (1969); (5) Gupta version (1967); and (6) Mann (1968) 
version. These versions are respectively specified below in regressions (1) to (6) for South 
African individual provinces: 
 
G = f(Y)          (1) 
        
C= f(Y)          (2) 
 
G = f(Y/P)          (3) 
 
G/Y = f(Y/P)          (4) 
 
G/P = f(Y/P)          (5) 
 
G/Y = f(Y)          (6) 
 
Where G stands for real government expenditure, C stands for government 
consumption expenditure, Y stands for real GDP, G/Y is share of government spending in 
GDP, P is population such that Y/P is per capita GDP, and G/P is government spending per 
capita. Using log-linear functional form for each version, where t is the time subscript and e 
is the random error term, the following ARDL specifications can be specified for empirical 
purposes:  
 
𝑔𝑡 = 0 + 1𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑔𝑡−𝑖 + 2𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 1𝑖𝑔𝑡−𝑖 + 2𝑖𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑡  (7) 
 
𝑐𝑡 = 0 + 1𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑐𝑡−𝑖 + 2𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 1𝑖𝑐 + 2𝑖𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑡  (8) 
 
𝑔𝑡 = 0 + 1𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑔𝑡−𝑖 + 2𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑦/𝑝𝑡−𝑖 + 1𝑖𝑔𝑡−𝑖 + 2𝑖𝑦/𝑝𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑡 (9) 
 
𝑔/𝑦𝑡 = 0 + 1𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑔/𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 2𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑦/𝑝𝑡−𝑖 + 1𝑖𝑔/𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 2𝑖𝑦/𝑝 + 𝑡  (10) 
 
𝑔/𝑝𝑡 = 0 + 1𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑔/𝑝𝑡−𝑖 + 2𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑦/𝑝𝑡−𝑖 + 1𝑖𝑔/𝑝𝑡−𝑖 + 2𝑖𝑦/𝑝 + 𝑡  (11) 
 𝑔/𝑝𝑡 = 0 + 1𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑔𝑝𝑡−𝑖 + 2𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 1𝑖𝑔/𝑝𝑡−𝑖 + 2𝑖𝑦 + 𝑡  (12) 
 
Where the small letter represents the log transformation of the series,  is a first 
difference operator, 0 is the intercept term, the parameters 1, …, 2 and 1, …, 2 are the 
short-run and long-run elasticities, respectively, and t is a well-behaved error term. The 
bounds test for cointegration can be implemented straightforward by testing the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration (i.e. 1 = 2 = 0), which is tested against the alternative 
hypothesis of ARDL cointegration effects (i.e. 1 ≠ 2 ≠ 0). Only if the F-statistic exceeds the 
upper critical bound, then cointegration effects are validated and the following unrestricted 
error correction model (UECM) representation of the ARDL regressions (8) can be modelled: 
 
𝑔𝑡 = 0 + 1𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑔𝑡−𝑖 + 2𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑦𝑡−𝑖 +  𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1+ 𝑡   (13) 
 
𝑐 = 0 + 1𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑔𝑐𝑡−𝑖 + 2𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑦𝑡−𝑖 +  𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1+ 𝑡   (14) 
 
𝑔𝑡 = 0 + 1𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑔𝑡−𝑖 + 2𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑦/𝑝𝑡−𝑖 +  𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1+ 𝑡   (15) 
 
𝑔/𝑦𝑡 = 0 + 1𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑔/𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 2𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑦/𝑝𝑡−𝑖 +  𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1+ 𝑡  (16) 
 
𝑔/𝑝𝑡 = 0 + 1𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑔/𝑝𝑡−𝑖 + 2𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑦/𝑝𝑡−𝑖 +  𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1+ 𝑡   (17) 
 
𝑔/𝑝𝑡 = 0 + 1𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑔𝑝𝑡−𝑖 + 2𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑦𝑡−𝑖 +  𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1+ 𝑡    (18) 
 
Where ectt-1 is the error correction term, which is measures the speed of adjustment 
back to equilibrium subsequent to a shock to the system.  
  
3.2 Sequential panel selection method to cointegration 
 
To conduct the SPSM to cointegration we rely the pooled mean group (PMG) panel 
estimation of Pesaran et al. (1999) which is a generalized panel extension of the ARDL 
model outlined in the previous section. In it’s generalized form the panel model can be 
specified as: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 0 + 1𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 2𝑖𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜓𝑖𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡     (19) 
 
And associated equilibrium error correction representation is given as: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 0 + 1𝑖 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 1𝑖𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1− 0𝑖 − 1𝑖𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡    (20) 
 
Where 0𝑖 =
𝛼𝑖
1−
𝑖
, 1𝑖 =
0𝑖+ 1𝑖
1−
𝑖
 and i = (ψi- 1). The above described panel 
cointegration framework is coupled with the panel cointegration test of Kao (1999). In 
outlining the Kao (1999) cointegration test, we assume the residual terms obtained from a 
panel regression, eit, can be expressed as: 
 
𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝑗 𝑒𝑖𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑝
𝑛
𝑗=1        (21) 
 
 And from equation (19) the null hypothesis of no cointegration is given as: 
 
H0:  = 1          (22) 
 
 Kao (1999) suggests that the no cointegration null hypothesis can be tested using the 
following modified ADF-type test statistic: 
 𝑡𝑘𝑎𝑜 = 
𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑓+ 6𝑁 𝑣/(2 𝑜𝑣)
 𝑜𝑣
2 /(2
𝑣
2
)+3 𝑣
2/(10 𝑜𝑣
2 )
 ~ 𝑁(0,1)      (23) 
 
 Where 𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑓 =
 −1 [ (𝑒𝑖
′𝑄𝑖𝑒𝑖)]
1
2𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑠𝑣
. In order to econometrically carry out the SPSM 
procedure to cointegration analysis, we firstly produce a series of individual F-statistics, Fi = 
(Fj1, Fj2, …, FjM) after carrying out the ARDL bounds test for cointegation on the individual 
provinces. We then specify our binary object function, , which takes the value of 1 if the 
panel tkao test statistic rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegration and zero otherwise. We 
then implement the following 3-stage algorithm to separate the cointegration from non-
cointegrated series. 
 
Stage 1: Initially estimate the PMG regression with all individual provinces included in the 
estimation. 
Stage 2: Perform a decision rule in which the Kao test statistic given in equation (13) 
associated is computed and set  = 0 if the test statistic is insignificant or else we set  = 1 if 
the test statistic is significant. Only if   = 1 is true that we continue to the next stage, 
otherwise we stop the procedure.  
Stage 3: We identify the individual province which produces a β coefficient with the highest 
absolute value of the F-statistic and remove it from the panel and re-estimate the PMG on a 
reducing panel. We then return to stage 2 and repeat the process.  
 
4. DATA AND RESULTS 
 
Our data has been sourced from Quantec online statistical database and consists of 
total government expenditure, population and economic growth for the nine South African 
provinces i.e. Western Cape (WC), Eastern Cape (EC), Northern Cape (NC), Free State (FS), 
Kwa-Zulu Natal (KZN), North West (NW), Gauteng (GP), Mpumalanga (MPL) and 
Limpopo (LIM). All data are collected on annual frequency from 2001 to 2016 in their raw 
form and for empirical purposes the series are converted into their natural logarithms. 
Moreover, using our empirical data we construct three additional variables; those being; i) 
government share of GDP (g/y), ii) income per capita (y/p) and iii) government spending per 
capita (g/p). Owing to data constraints we do not use Pryor (1969) version and hence we only 
estimate 5 versions of Wagner’s law. Also prior to estimation of our panel regressions, we 
perform conventional panel unit root tests of Levin et al. (2002) and Im et al. (2002) and the 
reported results in Table 1 indicate that none of the series is integrated of an order higher than 
I(1), which is a property of the time series which allows compatible of the variables with our 
designated methodology.  
 
Table 1: Unit root test results 
series LLC  IPS 
 Intercept Intercept and trend  intercept Intercept and trend 
g 0.33 
[-6.60]*** 
-1.60* 
[-5.25]*** 
 3.99 
[-4.30]*** 
-0.32 
[-2.26]** 
y -4.78*** 
[-5.63]*** 
2.06 
[-6.14]*** 
 -1.43* 
[-3.90]*** 
3.81 
[-3.95]*** 
g/y 1.49 
[-8.02]*** 
-0.36 
[-7.16]*** 
 4.02 
[-5.66]*** 
1.11 
[-4.08]*** 
y/p -4.41*** 
[-4.90]*** 
2.31 
[-5.95]*** 
 -1.51* 
[-3.55]*** 
4.17 
[-3.70]*** 
g/p -4.40*** 
[4.90]*** 
2.31 
[-5.95]*** 
 -1.51* 
[-3.55]*** 
4.17 
[-3.70]*** 
Notes: significance codes “***”, “**”, “*” are 1%, 5% and 10% critical levels, respectively. 
Test statistics for first difference reported in []. 
 
Our empirical analysis is summarized in the following three steps. In the first step, we 
compute the F-statistics bounds tests for all individual provinces for all 5 estimated versions 
of Wagner’s law and this amounts to the estimation of 45 individual ARDL regressions. As 
can be easily observed from the results reported in Table 2, all produced F-statistics fail to 
exceed their respectively 10 percent upper critical levels hence implying that we cannot rely 
ARDL framework for empirical purposes. Encouragingly enough, this also implies that out 
suggested SPSM framework for panel cointegration can be utilized as an alternative.   
 
Table 2: “Bounds” test for cointegration for individual provinces 
Province G = f(Y) G = f(Y/P) G/Y = f(Y/P) G/P = f(Y/P) G/Y = f(Y) 
WC 1.04 0.80 1.07 0.87 1.26 
EC 2.55 2.69 2.37 2.81 2.26 
FS 1.14 1.03 1.21 1.09 1.30 
GP 3.74 1.78 1.29 2.17 2.67 
LIM 1.06 0.83 1.49 0.96 1.76 
NW 0.62 0.22 0.54 0.18 1.09 
KZN 1.99 1.82 1.71 1.94 1.83 
MPL 1.26 0.92 0.87 0.99 1.19 
NC 1.23 0.87 1.28 0.94 1.56 
The 10% critical values for bounds test are as follows: I(0) – 3.02, I(1) – 3.51. 
 
In the second step of our empirical process, we proceed to implement the SPSM to 
cointegration discussed in the previous section of the paper. To achieve this we firstly arrange 
the individual F-statistics obtained in Table 2, from the statistics with the highest rejection 
(largest F-statistic) to that of the lowest statistic (smallest F-statistic). Note that this has been 
done for all provinces and for all 5 estimated versions of Wagner’s law which are reported in 
Table 3. Also note that the optimal lags for each of the regressions has been selected based on 
the minimization of Schwarz information criterion. Then afterwards, we compute the 
associated Kao (1999) panel statistics for all 5 versions of Wagner’s law, firstly for the entire 
panel (as indicate by sequence 1), and then on a reducing balance, where we firstly remove 
the province which produces the highest individual F-statistic, which in our case is Gauteng 
for the Peacock-Wiseman (1961) and Mann (1968) versions of Wagner’s law and the Eastern 
Cape for the remaining versions.  
 
We then re-calculate the Kao (1999) test statistic for the reduced panel and then 
remove the provinces with the second largest F-statistic, which is now Eastern Cape for 
Peacock-Wiseman (1961) and Mann (1968) versions, Gauteng for the Gupta version (1967) 
version and KZN for the Goffman (1968) and Musgrave (1969) versions. Even though by 
description we are only supposed to carry out the process until the panel Kao cointegration 
test static fails to detect any cointegration effects, we decide to carry out this procedure 
throughout all diminishing panel sets for completeness and confirmation sake.  
 
After completing the entire procedure, as reported in Table 3, we observe that panels 
inclusive of GP, EC and KZN produces significant cointegration effects whereas when these 
provinces are removed from the panel, the remaining panel regressions indicate no significant 
cointegration effects. However, we are quick to note that the results obtained for the 
Musgrave (1969) and Gupta (1967) versions are not as optimistic as none of the computed 
Kao (1999) statistics can reject the null hypothesis of no panel cointegration whereas that for 
the Mann (1968) version is only significant with Gauteng included in the panel sample and 
insignificant once this province is removed from the panel. It is therefore only for the 
Peacock-Wiseman (1961) version and (2) Pryor (1969) versions that all three provinces (GP, 
EC and KZN) are found to contribute to the finding of significant Wagner effects in the 
panel. 
 
Table 3: Kao’s (1999) panel cointegration tests on sequential panels 
 G = f(Y) G = f(Y/P) G/Y = f(Y/P) G/P = f(Y/P) G/Y = f(Y) 
sequence max  
F-stat 
Kao 
statistic 
max  
F-stat 
panel 
estimate 
max  
F-stat 
panel 
estimate 
max  
F-stat 
panel 
estimate 
max  
F-stat 
panel 
estimate 
1 GP -2.43 
(0.00)*** 
EC -1.99 
(0.47) 
EC -0.13 
(0.45) 
EC -0.34 
(0.33)* 
GP -1.61 
(0.05)* 
2 EC -1.84 
(0.00)*** 
KZN -1.96 
(0.02)** 
KZN -0.03 
(0.49) 
GP -0.32 
(0.36) 
EC -1.17 
(0.12) 
3 KZN -1.55 GP -1.95 LIM 0.06 KZN -0.03 KZN -0.88 
(0.06)* (0.02)** (0.47) (0.49) (0.19) 
4 MPL -1.22 
(0.11) 
FS -0.59 
(0.29)* 
GP 0.22 
(0.41) 
FS 0.16 
(0.44) 
LIM -0.45 
(0.32) 
5 NC -0.57 
(0.28) 
MPL -0.60 
(0.19) 
NC 0.56 
(0.29) 
MPL 0.54 
(0.29) 
NC -0.10 
(0.46) 
6 FS 0.02 
(0.49) 
NC -031 
(0.38) 
FS 1.26 
(0.10) 
LIM 0.97 
(0.17) 
FS 0.25 
(0.40) 
7 LIM 0.52 
(0.30) 
LIM 0.51 
(0.30) 
WC 1.62 
(0.05) 
NC 1.19 
(0.12) 
WC 0.78 
(0.22) 
8 WC 1.07 
(0.14) 
WC 1.16 
(0.12 
MPL 1.95 
(0.02) 
WC 2.15 
(0.02) 
MPL 0.95 
(0.17) 
9 NW 2.38 
(0.00) 
NW 3.45 
(0.00) 
NW 3.18 
(0.00) 
NW 3.39 
(0.00) 
NW 2.84 
(0.00) 
Notes: significance codes “***”, “**”, “*” are 1%, 5% and 10% critical levels, respectively. 
p-values reported in (). 
 
In the final step of our empirical procedure, we then estimate the long-run 
coefficients, the short-run coefficients and the error correction terms for our PMG regressions 
performed for all versions of Wagner’s law. These estimates are respectively reported in 
Tables 4, 5 and 6 and as previously mentioned the optimal lag selection as determined by the 
Schwarz information criterion is (1,0) for all models. To also ensure robustness of our 
estimated regressions we use the Newly-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent (HAC) estimators. Recall, that according to our rule of thumb, regression estimates 
are supposed to be produced only for ‘panels’ which passed the cointegation tests reported in 
Table 3, and yet, for completeness sake we report all regression estimates on the entire 
samples of reducing panels. However, to ensure the ease of interpretation, we report the 
estimates of panels which passed the cointegration tests in bold. A can be observed  from 
Table 4, all long-run regressions for the panels of GP, EC and KZN from the Peacock-
Wiseman (1961) and Pryor (1969) version as well as those inclusive of the GP for the Mann 
(1968) version, all produce positive estimates which are significant at all critical levels. These 
positive long-run estimates are comparable to those previously obtained in the studies of 
Ogbonna (2009), Menyah and Wolde-Rufael (2012), Odhiambo (2015) and Phiri (2017). 
 
In turning to the associated short-run coefficients and error correction terms for these 
significant panels as reported in Tables 4 and 5, respectively, we firstly highlight that all 
panels obtain negative and highly statistically significant estimates for the short-run 
coefficients. Similar findings of a negative coefficient estimate are found in the study of 
Chipaumire et al. (2014). Moreover, all ‘significant’ panel regressions produce error 
correction terms which have the correct negative and statistically significant estimates hence 
implying reversion back to steady-state equilibrium in the face of an exogenous shock to the 
system. What can be collectively drawn from our empirical exercise is that while Wagner’s 
law only holds for South African provinces over the long-run, such effects o not exist over 
the short-run where government size is negatively correlated with economic growth or it’s 
variant measures. However, our analysis also shows that Wagner’s law only holds if the GP, 
EC and KZN provinces are included in the panels, hence implicating that these provinces are 
responsible for any observed Wagner’s law at aggregated levels. 
 
What is further important to realize from our empirical exercise, is that if we had 
relied strictly on individual ARDL regressions, we would have come to the conclusion of no 
evidence of Wagner’s effect at provincial level, seeing that none of the obtained F-statistics 
testing cointegration managed to reject the “no cointegration” null hypothesis. On the other 
hand, if we strictly relied on panel regression estimates for the entire provinces we would 
have concluded that fiscal budgets are mutual sustainable across the provinces. We therefore 
consider our empirical exercise as some-what of a success.  
 
Table 4: Long-run estimates 
 G = f(Y) G = f(Y/P) G/Y = f(Y/P) G/P = f(Y/P) G/Y = f(Y) 
sequence max  
F-stat 
panel 
estimate 
max  
F-stat 
panel 
estimate 
max  
F-stat 
panel 
estimate 
max  
F-stat 
panel 
estimate 
max  
F-stat 
panel 
estimate 
1 GP 2.64 
(0.00)*** 
EC 3.38 
(0.00)*** 
EC 2.11 
(0.00)*** 
EC 3.11 
(0.00)*** 
GP 2.19 
(0.00)*** 
2 EC 2.60 
(0.00)*** 
KZN 3.90 
(0.00)*** 
KZN 2.48 
(0.00)*** 
GP 3.48 
(0.00)*** 
EC 2.16 
(0.00)*** 
3 KZN 2.65 
(0.00)*** 
GP 4.79 
(0.00)*** 
LIM 3.06 
(0.00)*** 
KZN 3.22 
(0.00)*** 
KZN 2.12 
(0.00)*** 
4 MPL 2.62 
(0.00)*** 
FS 4.67 
(0.00)*** 
GP 3.05 
(0.00)*** 
FS 3.73 
(0.00)*** 
LIM 2.03 
(0.00)*** 
5 NC 2.54 
(0.00)*** 
MPL 4.56 
(0.00)*** 
NC 2.73 
(0.01)** 
MPL 3.66 
(0.00)*** 
NC 2.01 
(0.00)*** 
6 FS 2.44 
(0.00)*** 
NC 4.61 
(0.01)** 
FS 2.60 
(0.02)** 
LIM 3.74 
(0.01)** 
FS 1.99 
(0.00)*** 
7 LIM 2.39 
(0.00)*** 
LIM 4.31 
(0.02)** 
WC 2.52 
(0.03)* 
NC 3.74 
(0.01)** 
WC 2.07 
(0.00)*** 
8 WC 2.37 
(0.00)*** 
WC 4.30 
(0.02)** 
MPL 2.50 
(0.09)* 
WC 3.51 
(0.02)** 
MPL 2.77 
(0.01)** 
9 NW 2.93 
(0.00)*** 
NW 3.82 
(0.24) 
NW 2.39 
(0.38) 
NW 3.39 
(0.22) 
NW 3.62 
(0.24) 
Notes: significance codes “***”, “**”, “*” are 1%, 5% and 10% critical levels, respectively. 
p-values reported in (). 
 
Table 5: Short-run estimates 
 G = f(Y) G = f(Y/P) G/Y = f(Y/P) G/P = f(Y/P) G/Y = f(Y) 
sequence max  
F-stat 
panel 
estimate 
max  
F-stat 
panel 
estimate 
max  
F-stat 
panel 
estimate 
max  
F-stat 
panel 
estimate 
max  
F-stat 
panel 
estimate 
1 GP -1.92 
(0.00)*** 
EC -1.83 
(0.00)*** 
EC -2.69 
(0.00)*** 
EC -1.83 
(0.00)*** 
GP -1.92 
(0.00)** 
2 EC -2.07 
(0.00)*** 
KZN -1.70 
(0.00)*** 
KZN -2.55 
(0.00)*** 
GP -1.68 
(0.00) 
EC -2.07 
(0.00)*** 
3 KZN -1.84 
(0.00)*** 
GP -1.63 
(0.00)*** 
LIM -2.50 
(0.00)*** 
KZN -1.79 
(0.00)*** 
KZN -1.79 
(0.00)*** 
4 MPL -1.78 
(0.00)*** 
FS -1.74 
(0.00)*** 
GP -2.57 
(0.00)*** 
FS -1.73 
(0.00)*** 
LIM -1.74 
(0.00)*** 
5 NC -1.56 
(0.00)*** 
MPL -1.83 
(0.00)*** 
NC -2.73 
(0.00) 
MPL -1.82 
(0.00)*** 
NC -1.60 
(0.00)*** 
6 FS -1.34 
(0.00)*** 
NC -1.63 
(0.00)*** 
FS -2.59 
(0.00)*** 
LIM -1.63 
(0.00)*** 
FS -1.69 
(0.00)*** 
7 LIM -1.36 
(0.00)*** 
LIM -1.38 
(0.00)*** 
WC -2.72 
(0.00)*** 
NC -1.82 
(0.00)*** 
WC -1.77 
(0.00)*** 
8 WC -1.50 
(0.00)*** 
WC -1.54 
(0.00)*** 
MPL -2.82 
(0.00)*** 
WC -1.56 
(0.00)*** 
MPL -1.09 
(0.00)*** 
9 NW -1.18 
(0.00)*** 
NW -1.53 
(0.00)*** 
NW -2.36 
(0.00)*** 
NW -1.51 
(0.00)*** 
NW -1.13 
(0.00)*** 
Notes: significance codes “***”, “**”, “*” are 1%, 5% and 10% critical levels, respectively. 
p-values reported in (). 
 
Table 6: Error correction estimates 
 G = f(Y) G = f(Y/P) G/Y = f(Y/P) G/P = f(Y/P) G/Y = f(Y) 
sequence max  
F-stat 
panel 
estimate 
max  
F-stat 
panel 
estimate 
max  
F-stat 
panel 
estimate 
max  
F-stat 
panel 
estimate 
max  
F-stat 
panel 
estimate 
1 GP  -0.18 
(0.00)*** 
EC  -0.12 
(0.00)*** 
EC -0.14 
(0.00)*** 
EC  -0.14 
(0.00)*** 
GP  -0.20 
(0.00)*** 
2 EC  -0.19 
(0.00)*** 
KZN -0.11 
(0.00)*** 
KZN  -0.13 
(0.00)*** 
GP -0.13 
(0.00)*** 
EC -0.21 
(0.00)*** 
3 KZN  -0.17 
(0.00)*** 
GP -0.09 
(0.00)*** 
LIM -0.11 
(0.00)*** 
KZN -0.12 
(0.00)*** 
KZN -0.19 
(0.00)*** 
4 MPL -0.15 
(0.00)*** 
FS -0.08 
(0.00)*** 
GP -0.13 
(0.00)*** 
FS -0.10 
(0.00)*** 
LIM -0.17 
(0.00)*** 
5 NC -0.10 
(0.00)*** 
MPL -0.09 
(0.01)*** 
NC -0.12 
(0.00)*** 
MPL -0.12 
(0.00)*** 
NC -0.18 
(0.00)*** 
6 FS -0.10 
(0.00)*** 
NC -0.07 
(0.00)*** 
FS -0.13 
(0.00)*** 
LIM -0.09 
(0.00)*** 
FS -0.21 
(0.00)*** 
7 LIM -0.11 
(0.01)** 
LIM -0.07 
(0.05)* 
WC -0.15 
(0.00)*** 
NC -0.11 
(0.00)*** 
WC -0.23 
(0.05)* 
8 WC -0.15 
(0.00)*** 
WC -0.11 
(0.02)** 
MPL -0.18 
(0.00)*** 
WC -0.13 
(0.00)*** 
MPL -0.14 
(0.03)* 
9 NW -0.18 
(0.00)*** 
NW -0.13 
(0.02)** 
NW -0.15 
(0.00)*** 
NW -0.15 
(0.00)*** 
NW -0.08 
(0.00)*** 
Notes: significance codes “***”, “**”, “*” are 1%, 5% and 10% critical levels, respectively. 
p-values reported in (). 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
In our study we extend the SPSM method and implement it within the setting of a 
cointegration framework. We consider this an important contribution to literature more 
particularly for researchers investigating economic relationships which require the use of 
time series estimation techniques and yet have short associated time series data to work with. 
In such instances, panel time series data consisting of multiple countries or regions can be 
used and through the use of the SPSM technique demonstrated in this paper, one can retain 
the power of panel regression estimates yet retain the heterogeneity advantages presented by 
individual country/region estimates. Through an application of the SPSM method of 
cointegration to Wagner’s law for South African provinces, we find that panels consisting of 
Gauteng, Eastern Cape and Kwazulu-Natal find significant Wagner effects whereas, when 
these provinces are removed from the panels, cointegration effects are absent.  
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